Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity.2 There is, however, a first-order theory of PRPs that results when standard firstorder logic is supplemented with an operation of intensional abstraction. It turns out that this first-order theory of PRPs is provably complete with respect to its standard notions of validity. The construction involves the development of a new algebraic semantic method. Unlike most other methods used in contemporary intensional logic, this method does not appeal to possible worlds as a heuristic; the heuristic used is that of PRPs taken as primitive entities. This is important, for even though the possible-worlds approach is useful in treating modal logic, it seems to be of little help in treating the logic for psychological matters. The present approach, by contrast, appears to make a step in the direction of a satisfactory treatment of both modal and intentional logic. For, by taking PRPs as primitive entities, we remain free to tailor the statement of their identity conditions so that it agrees with the logical data-modal, psychological, etc. In this way, the present approach suggests a strategy for developing a comprehensive treatment of intensional logic.
These functions HE$' are to be thought of as telling us the alternate or possible extensions of the elements of !J). ~is a distinguished element of$' and is to be thought of as the function that determines the actual extensions of the elements of !J). Id is a distinguished element of !JJ 2 and is thought of as the fundamental logical relation-in-intension identity. Id must satisfy the following condition: ( 
A proto-transformation is defined to be a function that arises from composing a finite number of these functions in some order (repetitions permitted 
where u e qc;, i ~ 1, and v e £&i> j ~ k ~ 1. The following examples help to explain the predication functions Pred 0 , Pred,, Pred,, Pred,, ... : •on conception 1 PRPs are thought of as the actual qualities, connections, and conditions of things; on conception 2 PRPs are thought ofas concepts and thoughts. (See §2 in [1] and § §40--41 in [2] for discussion of these distinctions.) Conception 1 and conception 2 correspond very closely to what Alonzo Church calls, respectively, Alternative 2 and Alternative 0 (pp. 4 ff. in [3] and pp. 143 ff. in [5] ). Church states that he ' ... attaches greater importance to Alternative 0 because it would seem that it is in this direction that a satisfactory analysis is to be sought of statements regarding assertion and belief.' (p. 7 n. in [3] ). A fuller defense of his approach to the logic for psychological matters is given by Church in [4] , where he develops the criterion of strict synonymy upon which he bases Alternative 0. And I discuss at length the importance of conception 2 in [2] § §2, 4, 6-11, 18-20, 39.
For the present purposes, I advocate developing both conception 1 and conception 2 side by side without attaching greater importance to one over the other. An advantage of such a dual approach is that, once these two conceptions are well developed, it is relatively straightforward to adapt our methods to handle intermediate conceptions in the event that they condition:
This auxiliary condition provides a precise characterization of conception 1. In contrast to conception 1, conception 2 places far stricter conditions on the identity of intensional entities. According to conception 2, when an intension is defined completely, it has a unique, noncircular definition. (The possibility that such complete definitions might in some or even all cases be infinite need not be ruled out.)
This leads to the following definition. A model structure is type 2 if./d 1 the transformations in f7 and the functions Conj, Neg, Exist, Pred 0 , Pred 1 , Pred2, ... are all (i) one-one, (ii) disjoint in their ranges, and (iii) noncycling. Auxiliary conditions (i)-(iii) provide us with a precise formulation of conception 2. 6 In order to state the semantics for Lw, I must define some preliminary syntactic notions. First, I define certain syntactic operations on complex terms of Lw. [2] once one enriches model structures with appropriate additional logical operations (including a primitive operation for conditionalization): e.g., for each non degenerate finite composition of the present logical operations, one might add a primitive operation that is equivalent to it in H-values. The broader philosophical point is that, if there is artificiality in the construction given in the text, it appears not to be inherent in the general algebraic approach; evidently it can be removed by some combination of the above methods. It does not follow, of course, that these methods can be used to rid other approaches to intensional logic of their forms of artificiality. For example, the familiar approach that identifies PRPs with functions seems to have a form of artificiality that cannot be removed by any means (cf., §24 [2] ). 'Taken together, (i)and (ii) guarantee that the action of the inverses of the 5'-transformations and Conj, Neg, ... in a type 2 model structure is to decompose each element of £2 into a unique (possibly infinite) complete tree. (A decomposition tree is complete if it contains no terminal node that could be decomposed further under the inverses of the 5'-transformations and Conj, Neg, ... Consider the operations rJ that arise from composing a finite number of these operations in some order (repetitions permitted). A relation R 11 is a term-transforming relation if it is associated with one of these operations rJ as follows: 
,,.H(tk). Then, D J.ot'.H([B(vh)]a = D J..r.H([B(tk)]a)·

LEMMA 3. For all J, d, .,#and for all f!}k
c :!} E .fi, k ~ 0, DJ..r.H([A]v 1 •. v) E f!}k.
LEMMA 4. For all J, d, .,ft and for all terms t and t', if .,ft is type I, then D J.ot.H([t = t]) = D J.ot.H([t' = t']).
LEMMA 5. Let v, be an externally quantifiable variable in [A(v,)la·
,,.H((3vk)A) if! there is an assignment d' relative to .,ft such that d' is just liked except perhaps in what it assigns to vk andT_,..,,,_u(A).
Then, given these lemmas, which are in most cases proofs by induction on the complexity of terms or formulas, the verification of the soundness of T 1 is straightforward. To prove Lemma 1, we first form an extension L! of L(J) that has denumerably many primitive names and denumerably many new i-ary primitive predicates for each i ~ 0. The sentences of L ! are then arranged into a sequence of consecutive sentences Ai. A 2 , A 3 , .
•. having the following property: A 1 = A 2 and for every closed term [B] 01 PROOF. The proof of the soundness of T2 is quite straightforward. For example, the soundness of d8 follows-directly from Lemma 6 (stated ealier); d9, from the fact that §"-transformations and the logical functions Conj, Neg, Exist, Pred 0 , ... in a type 2 model structure all have disjoint ranges; dlO and d 11, from the fact that all these functions are 1-1; dl2, from the fact that they are noncycling.
The soundness proofs for RI and R2 are standard.
For the soundness of 8f'3, the induction hypothesis yields 1= 2 A(t(F1)). Hence, by the soundness of R2, A2, and A5 (Leibniz's law), we have 1= 2 t(F1) = t' ~ A(t'). But since F1 is a nonlogical predicate and does not occur inA(t'), 1= 2 A(t').
The completeness proof is again Henkin style. A set of L:-sentences is said to be perfect 2 if (I) it is maximal, consistent, w-complete and (2) We show, first, that every consistent set of L"'-sentences is included in some perfect 2 set of L:-sentences and, secondly, that every perfect 2 set has a type 2 model. The argument, while parallel to the argument used for Tl, is much simpler. §5. The logic for PRPs and necessary equivalence on conception 2. Let the 2-place logical predicate ~ N be adjoined to Lw. ~ N is intended to express the logical relation of necessary equivalence. ' That is, t and r are not in the range of the same term-transforming relation, nor are they in the range of the same syntactic operation--conjunction, negation, existential generalization, 
